

Message Text

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INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 03243

EXDIS USCTB

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: POLITICAL ADVISERS MEETING,
FEBRUARY 28

CTB MESSAGE NO. 155

1. SUMMARY. SENIOR POLITICAL ADVISERS, TIMERBAEV (USSR), EDMONDS (UK), AND NEIDLE (US), MET ON FEBRUARY 28 TO REVIEW PLAN OF WORK AND TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION OF SEVERAL KEY ISSUES. DURING COURSE OF CONVERSATION, A NUMBER OF INTERESTING ASPECTS OF SOVIET DEL'S THINKING WERE REVEALED. ON RELATIONSHIP OF THE TRILATERAL NEGOTIATION TO THE CCD, SOVS NOW HAVE A "WEAK PREFERENCE" FOR A 1963 MOSCOW TREATY-TYPE SOLUTION (THAT IS, THE THREE POWERS CONCLUDING AND SIGNING THE CTB AND THEN PERMITTING ANY OTHERS WHO WISH TO DO SO TO SIGN UP), BUT TIMERBAEV WANTS TO EXAMINE THE ISSUE FURTHER. ON QUESTION OF WHETHER A "SEISMIC EVENT" AND SEISMIC EVIDENCE SHOULD BE REQUIRED FOR LAUNCHING AN ON-SITE INSPECTION, TIMERBAEV
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UNDERSTANDS FULLY US DEL'S POSITION THAT THESE SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED, AND HE PERSONALLY BELIEVES THEY WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE IF WE WERE NEGOTIATING ONLY A SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT. BUT THE PROBLEM FOR THE SOV DEL IS THAT THEY ARE VERY ANXIOUS TO HAVE SUCH REQUIREMENTS IN THE MULTILATERAL TREATY. ON DURATION OF THE TREATY AND LINKAGE OF THE PNE BAN, TIMERBAEV EXPLAINED THAT ONE

POSSIBLE WAY TO HAVE "UNANIMITY OF ACTION" BY THE THREE NUCLEAR POWERS, BOTH IN ENTERING THE TREATY AND LEAVING IT, WOULD BE TO HAVE THE TREATY CONTINUE FOR AN INITIAL SPECIFIED DURATION WITH THE THREE NUCLEAR POWERS ABLE, BY AGREEMENT, TO EXTEND THE DURATION FOR ANOTHER SPECIFIED PERIOD. BUT TIMERBAEV SPECULATED THAT THERE WOULD BE COMPLEXITIES IN HAVING THIS DECISION TAKEN AT A REVIEW CONFERENCE, WHERE A DISSENTING NUCLEAR POWER WOULD FACE PRESSURES TO CONTINUE THE TREATY. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE CONVERSATION FOLLOW. END SUMMARY.

2. INTERNATIONAL SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE (ISDE). ALL THREE REPS AGREED THAT A SMALL SUBGROUP OF THE POLITICAL WORKING GROUP SHOULD GET TO WORK SEEING HOW CLOSE THE DELEGATIONS COULD COME IN PREPARING A DRAFT OF A TREATY ANNEX TO PROVIDE GUIDELINES FOR THE ISDE. IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT A NEUTRAL SPACE-HOLDING FORMULA, OR BRACKETED PHRASES, WOULD BE USED TO PRESERVE THE POSITIONS OF ALL SIDES ON WHETHER A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (AS PROPOSED BY THE US), OR AN AD HOC EXPERTS COMMITTEE (AS PROPOSED BY THE USSR) WOULD BE THE IMPLEMENTING BODY. TIMERBAEV RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE POSSIBLE EXPERIMENTAL EXERCISE ON DATA EXCHANGE BEING PROPOSED BY SOME CCD DELS. US REP SAID WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH THE EXERCISE IF IT HAD BROAD SUPPORT IN THE CCD, EXPLAINING THAT IT WOULD BE A CONTINUATION OF THE SECRET

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TECHNICAL WORK OF THE CCD EXPERTS, THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS THE BEGINNING OF ACTUAL CTB VERIFICATION, AND THAT IT COULD BE OF VALUE IN PROVIDING USEFUL, PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE WHICH COULD BE OF BENEFIT TO ALL PARTIES TO THE CTB LATER. UK REP AGREED.

3. ROLE OF THE CCD. US REP SAID THAT IN CONNECTION WITH ISDE A NUMBER OF CCD DELEGATIONS WERE WONDERING WHETHER THE CCD IN THE NEAR FUTURE COULD BEGIN CONSIDERATION OF THE QUESTION OF ACTUAL GUIDELINES. THESE DELEGATIONS WERE ARGUING THAT THE CCD SHOULD BEGIN WORK ON AT LEAST SOME ASPECTS OF THE CTB BEFORE THE SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (SSOD), WHERE THE CCD WAS BOUND TO BE IN FOR A VERY TOUGH TIME IF IT HAD NOT BEGUN ANY REAL WORK ON THE CTB. US REP MADE LEAR THAT HE WAS NOT MAKING ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSAL TO THE SOVIET SIDE, BUT WAS INTERESTED IF SOVIET DEL HAD GIVEN ANY THOUGHT TO THIS. TIMERBAEV RESPONDED THAT THIS RAISED A MUCH BIGGER QUESTION. SOV DEL WAS NOT YET CERTAIN THAT IT WOULD BE GOOD TO HAVE THE CD DOING ANY NEGOTIATION ON ANY CTB PROVISIONS. IF HE HAD TO DESCRIBE THE PRESENT STATE OF SOVIET THINKING, IT WAS THAT SOVS NOW HAD A WEAK PREFERENCE FOR THE THREE

NUCLEAR POWERS CONCLUDING THE NEGOTIATIONS, SIGNING A TEXT (AS THEY HAD DONE IN THE CASE OF THE 1963 MOSCOW TREATY) AND THEN INVITING OTHERS TO SIGN ALSO. UK REP SAID THIS WAS DEFINITELY NOT THE UK POSITION. HE DID NOT SEE SUCH A COURSE AS FEASIBLE IN TODAY'S WORLD. US REP AGREED AND SAID THAT WE WANTED AS BIG A SUCCESS AS POSSIBLE WITH THIS TREATY WHICH SHOULD INVOLVE WIDE MULTILATERAL ADHERENCE, AND IT WAS HARD TO VISUALIZE IN TODAY'S WORLD THAT MANY COUNTRIES WOULD RUSH TO SIGN IF THEY HAD HAD

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NO ROLE WHATEVER IN CREATING THE TREATY. HE ASKED WHAT WAS SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MANY HIGH-LEVEL STATEMENTS OF SOVIET REPS AT UN AND CCD WHEN THEY SAID THAT THE CCD SHOULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY. TIMERBAEV RESPONDED THAT THIS COULD BE A VERY BRIEF DEBATE ON THE TEXT OF THE TREATY WE HAD CONCLUDED. TIMERBAEV CONCEDED HOWEVER THAT THERE WERE MANY JUDGMENTAL FACTORS IN ASSESSING WHAT WAS THE BEST COURSE AND HE WANTED TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE AT GREATER LENGTH WHEN WE MET AGAIN. TIMERBAEV RETURNED TO THE SUBJECT OF THE CCD EXPERIMENTAL EXERCISE ON ISDE AND CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE MIGHT SEE SOME VALUE TO IT IN THE FRAMEWORK THAT US AND UK REPS HAD DESCRIBED.

4. RE PROBLEM OF SEISMIC EVENT AND LAUNCHING OSIS, US REP SAID HE WANTED TO EXPLAIN TO TIMERBAEV, SO THERE COULD BE NO POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING, HOW THERE COULD BE A SERIOUS AND REASONABLE SUSPICION OF AN EVENT WHICH MIGHT BE A VIOLATION OF THE TREATY, BUT WHICH DID NOT INVOLVE

SEISMIC EVIDENCE. HE TOOK TIMERBAEV THROUGH THE SCENARIO OF A RELATIVELY SMALL EXPLOSION SET OFF IN A CAVITY UNDERGROUND, THUS ELIMINATING A DETECTABLE SEISMIC SIGNAL,
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WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF A SUBSIDENCE CRATER FORMING AFTERWARDS, WHICH COULD PROVIDE VERY CLEAR AND SERIOUS VISUAL EVIDENCE. TIMERBAEV SAID HE UNDERSTOOD EVERY STAGE OF THE SCENARIO AND AGREED THIS COULD HAPPEN. HE THEN SAID THAT IF WE WERE ONLY NEGOTIATING THE SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE US AND USSR, WITH UK ASSOCIATION, HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO SPECIFY THAT A SEISMIC EVENT WAS NEEDED TO LAUNCH AN OSI. NOR WOULD IT BE NECESSARY IN EVERY CASE TO PROVIDE SEISMIC EVIDENCE. (THERE WAS NO AMBIGUITY IN THE WAY TIMERBAEV STATED THIS.) HOWEVER, THE SOV DEL, ACCORDING TO TIMERBAEV, WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROVISIONS FOR THE MULTILATERAL TREATY, WHERE THEY WOULD WANT THESE REQUIREMENTS, AND HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO SPECIFY "SEISMIC EVENT" IN THE MULTILATERAL TREATY LANGUAGE BUT NOT IN THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT. HE WONDERED IF WE COULD USE THE TERM "SEISMIC EVENT" IN THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT ALSO, BUT HAVE AN UNDERSTANDING THAT WOULD COVER THE EVIDENCE QUESTION, JUST AS THE US WANTED AN UNDERSTANDING ON OTHER ASPECTS OF OSIS. UK AND US REPS SAID THEY WERE GLAD THAT TIMERBAEV UNDERSTOOD THE MERITS OF THE ISSUE BUT SAID THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO RETURN TO A DISCUSSION OF WHAT WAS THE BEST WAY TO SOLVE THE ISSUE. TIMERBAEV AGREED.

5. TREATY DURATION AND LANGUAGE OF PNE BAN. THE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION BEGAN WITH TIMERBAEV ASKING FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE US DEC 7 WORKING PAPER. HE ASSUMED THAT SINCE THE PAPER HAD NOT SPECIFICALLY SAID THAT THE TREATY WOULD BE OF UNLIMITED DURATION, WE WERE PREPARED TO HAVE A TREATY WITH LIMITED DURATION. US REP SAID THIS WAS NOT CORRECT. WE HAD PROPOSED A TREATY WHICH COULD CONTINUE FOR AN UNLIMITED PERIOD, AND THEREFORE WOULD BE OF
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UNLIMITED DURATION; BUT COUNTRIES COULD AVAIL THEMSELVES OF EITHER OF THE TWO TYPES OF WITHDRAWAL CLAUSES WE HAD PROPOSED--THE SUPREME INTERESTS CLAUSE, OR THE CLAUSE RELATED TO CONTINUED TESTING BY OTHER COUNTRIES. US REP STRESSED THAT THIS REMAINED OUR VIEW AS TO THE BEST SOLUTION AND WE EXPECTED THE SOVS TO MOVE TOWARDS IT.

HE EXPLAINED THAT THE ESSENCE OF OUR PROPOSAL WAS THAT IT WOULD PERMIT A STABLE AND DURABLE TREATY WHICH COULD CONTINUE WITHOUT FRENCH AND CHINESE ADHERENCE. UK REP ASKED TIMERBAEV TO COMMENT FURTHER ON SOV DEL THINKING ABOUT ITS PRINCIPLE OF "UNANIMITY OF ACTION" BY THE THREE PARTICIPATING NUCLEAR POWERS BOTH IN ENTERING THE TREATY AND LEAVING IT. TIMERBAEV SAID THAT IT WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THIS PRINCIPLE IF THE TREATY WERE TO HAVE AN INITIAL DURATION FOR A SPECIFIED NUMBER OF YEARS, WITH A PROVISION THAT THE THREE NUCLEAR POWERS COULD DECIDE TOWARDS THE END OF THAT PERIOD WHETHER TO CONTINUE THE TREATY FOR ANOTHER SPECIFIED PERIOD. UK REP ASSUMED IT WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH SOV PRINCIPLE OF UNANIMITY IF THIS DECISION WERE TAKEN IN THE CONTEXT OF A REVIEW CONFERENCE. TIMERBAEV SAID THERE WERE GREAT COMPLEXITIES IN HIS POSSIBILITY, DESCRIBING THE FOLLOWING EXAMPLE. WHAT IF THE UK (READ USSR), FOR EXAMPLE, DID NOT WANT TO CONTINUE THE TREATY BUT THE US AND USSR DID? IF A LARGE MAJORITY AT THE REVIEW CONFERENCE WANTED TO CONTINUE THE TREATY, WOULDN'T THE DISSENTING NUCLEAR POWER FACE PRESSURES TO GO ALONG? EVEN IF THERE WERE CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE NUCLEAR POWERS BEFORE SUCH A REVIEW CONFERENCE, THERE MIGHT NOT BE AGREEMENT AMONG THEM WHEN THE ISSUE WENT TO THE REVIEW CONFERENCE. TIMERBAEV CONCLUDED THAT THERE WOULD BE MORE TO DISCUSS ON THIS GENERAL QUESTION.

6. EASTER BREAK. US REP NOTED THAT BY EASTER TIME WE WOULD HAVE BEEN IN SESSION AROUND EIGHT WEEKS AND

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IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR PEOPLE TO GET HOME FOR EASTER
AND ALSO TO HAVE A BRIEF OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT IN

CAPITALS. HE EXPLAINED THAT, ALLOWING FOR TRAVEL TIME
SO THAT DELEGATION MEMBERS COULD GET HOME BY GOOD FRIDAY,
US DEL WAS THINKING WE SHOULD HAVE MEETINGS NOT MORE THAN
A FEW DAYS IN THE WEEK OF MARCH 20, AND THEN, FOLLOWING
EASTER, WE SHOULD CONSIDER ABOUT TWO WEEKS TIME FOR
CONSULTATION IN CAPITALS. TIMERBAEV REITERATED RITUALIS-
TICALLY, WITH A SMILE, THAT SOV DEL WAS NATURALLY READY
TO WORK WITHOUT ANY INTERRUPTION. HOWEVER, HE OFFERED NO
SERIOUS COMMENT AND WROTE DOWN MARCH 21 AS A POSSIBLE
LAST DAY OF THIS SESSION WITH RESUMPTION OF MEETINGS
APRIL 10 OR 12. WARNKE

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